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Abstract
This paper develops a model of simple reputation systemsthat moni-
tor and publish information about the behavior of sellers in a market with
search frictions and asymmetric information. The reputations created by
these systems inuence the equilibrium search patterns of buyers and thus
provide for market-based punishmentof bad behavior. Our model allows
us to determine the e¤ects of the introduction of a reputation system on
the behavior and welfare of buyers and sellers in such a market. We show
that a simple reputation system that rewards honesty can enhance welfare
by allowing good sellers to truthfully signal their type. However, we also
show that in some cases the same reputation system is prone to strategic
manipulation by sellers who always have low quality products. In this
case, we show that an alternative simple reputation system that screens
for type can be superior.
1 Introduction
Many markets are characterized by both search frictions and asymmetric infor-
mation between buyers and sellers. For example, tourists visiting a new city
have only a limited amount of time to visit tourist attractions, and lack com-
plete information about which attractions are the best. Other examples include
diners looking for a restaurant and online markets where, due to the nature of
Acknowledgements: The authors are grateful to Espen Moen and two anonymous
referees for comments and suggestions that helped to improve the paper. The authors also
thank Heiko Gerlach, John Hillas, Ian King, Klaus Kultti, Eric Maskin, Matthew Ryan,
Torben Tranæs, Jean Robert Tyran, Andrew Wait, Julian Wright, and Randall Wright. Aaron
Schi¤ thanks the Centre for Research in Network Economics and Communications and John
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the trading environment, it is relatively easy for sellers to mislead buyers and
di¢ cult for buyers to assess the quality of products for sale. In such markets,
what we call reputation systemsoften exist to guide buyers in their search.
For the purposes of this paper, a reputation system is a third party that
collects and publishes information about historic seller behavior in a market.
For example, guidebooks exist to help tourists nd the best activities and diners
to nd the best restaurants. In online auctions, the market operator (such as
eBay) usually operates a system that collects information on the behavior of
sellers (and buyers) and publishes this information to all market participants.
The Internet in particular has lead to the emergence of a number of on-
line reputation systems.1 This is likely due to the lower costs associated with
collecting, analyzing, and disseminating reputational information in electronic
form. This development has led to theoretical and empirical research to examine
the algorithms used to assign reputations, not only by economists, but also by
sociologists and computer scientists. However, much of this work rests on either
behavioral assumptions, or in the case of economists, is driven by experimental
research,2 with the implicit assumption being one of bounded rationality.3 The
simple nite horizon model that we use in this paper has fully rational agents.
Our rst goal in this paper is to understand how the behavior of buyers
and sellers in a search market with asymmetric information is a¤ected by the
presence of simple reputation systems, and the consequent welfare e¤ects. Our
second goal is to compare di¤erent simple algorithms for assigning reputations
and determine their relative e¢ ciency.
To achieve these goals we use a two-period general equilibrium directed
search model where goods are sold through competing auctions. Sellers are
heterogeneous and there is asymmetric information between buyers and sellers.
We assume there are two types of sellers, goodand bad, and two product
quality levels, high and low. Bad sellers always have low quality for sale,
while good sellers sometimes have high quality and sometimes have low qual-
ity. Asymmetric information exacerbates the problem of search frictions. Our
model shows how reputation systems reduce the additional frictions caused by
asymmetric information.
The reputation system in our model is a third party that observes the market
in the rst period and publishes the information it gathers to all buyers in the
second period in as seller reputations. In the rst period sellers can advertise
whether they have a high or low quality product for sale. The reputation system
observes the advertisements and actual product qualities of all sellers, but does
1See Zacharia and Maes (2000) and Dellarocas (2003) for an overview.
2See, for example, Bolton et al. (2004).
3Most of these experiments evaluate the actions of agents in a nite event horizon and
seek to nd whether the agents actions are disciplined by a set of trigger strategies, which
are theoretically optimal only in an innite event horizon model.
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not observe whether any seller is of the good or the bad type.
We focus on reputational algorithms that use a simple 0,1 (good/bad) metric
to represent a sellers reputation. We consider two simple algorithms for the
assignment of reputations in the second period. The rst algorithm assigns a
sellers reputation by considering only the product quality that they had for
sale in the rst period. We call this reputation for type and under this system
all sellers who had low quality for sale in the rst period get a bad reputation,
while sellers who had high quality get a good reputation. We call the second
algorithm reputation for honesty. Under this system a sellers advertisement
is compared with the actual product quality that they had for sale in the rst
period. All sellers who lied about their product quality get a bad reputation in
the second period and all sellers who were honest get a good reputation.
In the context of this model we examine the e¤ects on the equilibrium search
patterns of buyers of the provision of such information about sellers. We show
that this always increases welfare relative to the case where buyers have no infor-
mation about sellers because buyer search is directed more accurately. However,
there are distributional e¤ects arising from the fact that in equilibrium buyers
may choose not to trade with sellers identied as having lower quality, and that
buyers themselves may be worse o¤ if the provision of information results in
intense competition for high quality products.
We also examine the relative e¢ ciency of the two di¤erent reputation systems
described above. There are two key di¤erences between the systems. First,
the honesty system links a sellers advertisement in the rst period with their
reputation in the second period. It therefore introduces a mechanism by which
a sellers advertisement can be a credible signal of their product quality in the
rst period. If such signalling arises in equilibrium, the honesty system can
create information in both periods. In contrast, the type system only creates
information in the second period, as it links reputations to only the product
quality that a seller had for sale in the rst period, which is not a strategic
variable for a seller.
The second key di¤erence relates to the ability of the systems to sort sellers
appropriately in the second period. Under the type system, a good seller will
receive a bad reputation if they happened to have a low quality product in
the rst period, even though there is some probability that they will have high
quality in the second period. On the other hand, the honesty system is prone
to strategic manipulation by bad type sellers, as they can get a good reputation
by simply being honest even though they always have low quality for sale.
The main implication of these di¤erences between the two systems is that
there is a tradeo¤ between reputation algorithms. For most of the parame-
ter values in our model, the honesty system does a better job of solving the
asymmetric information problem than the type system in terms of total wel-
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fare. However, if the probability that a good seller has a high quality product is
large enough, the equilibrium under the honesty system involves a high degree
of manipulation by bad type sellers. In such situations we show that the type
system is superior.
This paper extends existing research on the problem of asymmetric informa-
tion. There has been much work on this topic since the seminal contributions
of Akerlof (1970), Spence (1973) and Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976). We pro-
vide a model of how a third-party reputation system can ameliorate asymmetric
information problems in search markets. Alternative solutions to similar prob-
lems are addressed by Biglaiser (1993), and Li (1998) who examine the role of
middlemen, and Williamson and Wright (1994) who consider the role of money.
In our model we explicitly rule out long-term relationships between buyers and
sellers. This assumption is contrasted by a number of formal models of reputa-
tion that have the assumption of asymmetric information (Kreps and Wilson,
1982 and Diamond, 1989) but do not address the problem of how information
about past indiscretions is gathered and reported. Random matching models
by Ellison (1994) and Tirole (1996) address some of the issues related to our
paper. However, these models do not compare alternative reputation systems.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we present a simple
two-period model of seller advertisements, buyer search, and reputational assign-
ment. We then solve for the equilibrium of this model sequentially, considering:
(i) buyers search patterns, (ii) the partition of sellers under each reputation
system, and (iii) the choice of reputation system. The equilibrium properties
of the model are analyzed, and we compare the e¢ ciency of the two reputation
systems under. The nal section o¤ers concluding remarks.
2 The Model
A market operates for two periods, denoted t = 1; 2. The number of buyers in
the market equals the number of sellers and is normalized to 1. These num-
bers are su¢ ciently large so the set of each type of agent can be treated as a
continuum.
2.1 Sellers and products
Sellers o¤er products for sale that have one of two quality levels: high and low.
We normalize the high quality level to 1 and let 0   < 1 denote the relative
level of the low quality product.
The sellers are divided into two equal groups, which are distinguished by
types: good and bad. Bad sellers have a single unit of the low quality product
for sale in each period. Good sellers have a single unit of the high quality
product for sale with probability 0 <   1 in each period, otherwise they have
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a low quality product. Let bq =  + (1  )  denote the expected quality of a
good sellers product in each period, and the average quality of all products for
sale in each period is eq = 12 (bq + ) : (1)
In each period the sellers advertise, possibly untruthfully, whether they have
a high quality or low quality product. All advertisements are seen by all buyers.
Following the advertisements, every seller sells their product using an ascending
rst-price auction.4 For simplicity, the reserve price at every auction is assumed
to be zero.
2.2 Buyers and bidding
Each buyer i seeks to buy one unit of the product in each period. A buyer can
purchase the product only by going to a sellers location and participating in that
sellers auction. Upon visiting a seller, the buyer becomes perfectly informed
of the products quality, before bidding commences. Buyers are identical in
their willingness to pay for quality and the net utility function of a buyer at an
auction of seller j in period t is given by
ui
 
qtj ; p
t
ij

=
(
qtj   ptij if ptij is the winning bid
0 otherwise
,
where qtj is the quality of seller js product and p
t
ij is the bid of buyer i at seller
js auction.
Buyer i maximizes utility by bidding zero if they are the only buyer at the
auction and bidding qtj if there is at least one other bidder. Therefore, a seller
receives a non-zero price if and only if more than one buyer turns up to the
auction. E¤ectively we assume Bertrand competition among the buyers located
at any given seller.
We make these relatively simplistic assumptions about the auctions in the
model so as to focus on the e¤ects of reputation systems that come from the ag-
gregation and dissemination of information about past seller behavior. We also
assume that buyers can choose to visit only one seller in each period and never
purchase from the same seller twice, that is, we rule out long-term relationships.
2.3 Submarkets
For our purposes, a submarketrefers to a group of sellers that appear identical
from a buyers point of view. In each period the sellers may be separated
into two quality di¤erentiated submarkets by their advertisements in the rst
4McAfee (1993) o¤ers an early model of competing auctions. Kennes (2004) o¤ers a survey
of recent research. E¢ ciency is a well-known property of competing auction models (Julien,
Kennes and King, 2000).
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period and, in the presence of a reputation system, by their reputations in the
second period.5 Let qtl and q
t
h denote the expected quality levels of sellers in
the two submarkets in period t, and let t denote the fraction of sellers that are
allocated to the submarket with expected quality qtl . Without loss of generality
we assume qth  qtl . If sellers are separated in such a manner, the average quality
across the submarkets cannot change, thus
tqtl +
 
1  t qth = eq for t = 1; 2. (2)
For a given value of eq, one of t, qtl or qth can be recovered from knowledge
of the other two parameters. We thus dene an an information partition as
follows.
Denition 1 An information partition is a pair (; ql) where 0    1 is the
proportion of sellers allocated to the submarket with quality level 0  ql < eq.
Given an information partition (t; qtl ) in period t, the expected quality in
the high quality submarket is
qth
 
t; qtl

=
eq   tqtl
1  t . (3)
By observing advertisements in the rst period and reputations in the second
period, buyers are informed of qtl , q
t
h and 
t and simultaneously choose their
search patterns in each period. We use 1l and 
1
h to denote the measures of
market tightness in the rst-period submarkets dened by sellers who advertise
low and high quality respectively. Similarly, we use 2l and 
2
h to denote the
market tightnesses in the second-period submarkets dened by sellers who have
bad and good reputations respectively. The number of buyers equals the number
of sellers, so market tightness in the submarkets is related to overall market
tightness as follows:
ttl +
 
1  tth = 1 for t = 1; 2. (4)
From (4) we also have
th
 
t; tl

=
1  ttl
1  t . (5)
2.4 Search frictions and payo¤s
Search frictions exist because the buyers make uncoordinated search investments
when they choose the location of a single capacity-constrained seller. The search
investment of each buyer is directed by the set of submarkets potentially created
by the advertisements and reputations of sellers. It can be shown that, in a
5Second period advertisements have no informational content due to a lack of credibility
caused by the nite horizon of the game.
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(sub)market with tightness , the probability that more than one buyer turns
up to any given sellers auction is given by:6
p () = 1  e    e .
The expected prot of a seller with product quality qj in a submarket of tightness
 is then given by Vj = p () qj .
What matters to a buyer is whether or not they are alone at a sellers auction,
since they only get a strictly positive surplus from the auction in that case. The
probability that a buyer is alone at any given seller in a (sub)market with
market tightness  can be shown to be e  and the expected payo¤ of buyer i
of visiting a seller in a submarket with tightness  and expected quality qz is
given by Ui = e qz.
2.5 The reputation system
At the end of the rst period, the reputation system collects information on
seller behavior and assigns reputations to sellers according to some algorithm.
At the beginning of the second period, buyers observe sellersreputations be-
fore choosing which sellers auction to visit. We dene two di¤erent simple
algorithms for assigning reputations:
Denition 2 A reputation system screens for honesty if sellers that lied about
their product quality in period 1 are assigned a bad reputation in period 2, and
all sellers who were honest get a good reputation.
Denition 3 A reputation system screens for type if sellers that had a low
quality product for sale in period 1 are assigned a bad reputation in period 2,
and all sellers that had a high quality product for sale get a good reputation.
A reputation system that screens for honesty thus compares the advertise-
ments of sellers in period 1 with their actual product quality in that period.
Any seller who had a di¤erent quality from what they advertised receives a bad
reputation in period 2, and the honest sellers get a good reputation. In contrast,
a reputation system that screens for type only looks at the actual quality that
a seller had in period 1, and ignores their advertisement.
Note that the reputation system does not have access to any more informa-
tion than buyers do, but it does have the ability to aggregate and publish this
information.7 The reputation system can seethe advertisements of all sellers
6See Kennes (2004) for details.
7Monitoring can be done in many di¤erent ways and to keep the analysis as simple and
transparent as possible we assume perfect monitoring. In an earlier version of this paper we
have shown that imperfect monitoring or assigning reputations based on reports of buyers do
not change the main results of the paper.
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and the quality of the goods that were actually available but it cannot determine
whether any given seller is of the good type or the bad type. In addition, in this
paper we limit our attention to simple mechanisms that do not impose explicit
pecuniary punishments.8
Another possible reputation system is a combination of the above two sys-
tems whereby a sellers reputation informs buyers of both whether the seller was
honest in the rst period and the product quality that they had for sale. Such
a system would provide some additional information to buyers, but complicates
the analysis as it would potentially create at least three submarkets in the sec-
ond period. One of the main goals of this paper is to examine the conditions
under which honesty of sellers is a more important characteristic than the qual-
ity of goods that they sold. To focus on this tradeo¤, we have chosen only to
model simple reputation systems that report a single characteristic of sellers.
2.6 Timing
The timing of the game with a reputation system is as follows. At the start
of period 1, each seller observes their type (good or bad) and their product
quality (high or low). They then choose to advertise either high or low product
quality. Buyers observe the sellersadvertisements and simultaneously and in-
dependently choose one seller to visit. Buyers then bid on the sellers product
and the good is sold to the highest bidder. At the start of period 2, the rep-
utation system assigns a reputation to each seller. Sellers draw a new product
according to their type. Buyers observe the reputations and simultaneously and
independently choose one seller to visit. Bidding then takes place, the good is
sold to the highest bidder, and the game ends.
3 Equilibrium
In this section we characterize the equilibrium of the model. For comparison,
we rst briey characterize the equilibrium in the case where all sellers appear
identical to all buyers, that is, where there are no submarkets. We then turn to
the case where the existence of a reputation system creates submarkets in one
or both periods. The equilibrium of the model in this case is found backwards
induction. In particular, we rst evaluate the buyers choice of seller to bid
for given the submarkets that are created. We then consider the sellerschoice
of advertisement given the equilibrium strategy of buyers and the particular
reputation system under investigation.
8An alternative to a third-party reputation system is a third-party system that imposes
explicit punishments on sellers in the second period depending on their behavior in the rst
period (for example a system of consumer protection laws). A possible avenue for future
research is to compare the e¢ ciency of such systems with our reputation systems.
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For this section we drop the t superscripts where possible for notational
simplicity.
3.1 Equilibrium with no submarkets
In the absence of quality di¤erentiated submarkets, buyers randomize over the
locations of all sellers. We call this unguided search. As the buyer-seller ratio
is assumed to be 1, any given seller receives at least one buyer with probability
1  e 1. Over both periods, total welfare is therefore given by
W0 = 2
 
1  e 1 eq. (6)
3.2 Equilibrium search patterns with submarkets
The division of sellers into quality di¤erentiated submarkets in a period leads
to two possible congurations for the equilibrium search patterns of buyers in
that period. One possibility is that sellers in both submarkets are visited by all
buyers with strictly positive probability. In such a mixed strategy equilibrium,
we must have
qhe
 h = qle l . (7)
That is, the expected utility to buyers must be the same from visiting any seller.
The other possible type of equilibrium is that buyers visit only sellers in the
good submarket. In this case, h = 1= (1  ) and l = 0 . If what we call the
exclusion constraint,
qhe
  11   ql, (EC)
is satised then a buyer is better o¤ to locate in the high quality submarket
even though if he located in the low quality submarket he would not have to
compete with any other buyers and could obtain a payo¤ of ql with certainty.
Thus, if the partition of sellers into submarkets satises (EC), all buyers locate
in the high quality submarket in equilibrium.
It follows from (4), (7) and (EC) that, for any partition of sellers, the equi-
librium market tightness in the bad submarket in a period is given by
l (; ql) =
(
1  (1  ) ln (qh(; ql)=ql) if qh(; ql)e  11   ql
0 otherwise
, (8)
and h is given by (5).
If sellers in the bad submarket have strictly lower expected quality than
sellers in the good submarket, that is, 0  ql < eq < qh  1, then (5) and (8)
imply 0  l < 1 < h. Therefore, buyers visit each seller in the bad submarket
with lower probability than they visit each seller in the good submarket. In other
words, search is directed by the creation of quality-di¤erentiated submarkets.9
9Julien, Kennes and King (2000), Coles and Eeckhout (2003) and Shimer (2005) also
develop models of directed search.
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3.3 Welfare e¤ects
The decentralized actions of buyers in response to the creation of quality di¤er-
entiated submarkets raises a question of whether submarket creation is socially
e¢ cient. For example, if (EC) is satised, then there is increased competition
between buyers for the remaining high quality sellers, while low quality sellers
are unable to trade at all. Likewise, if low quality sellers are included, then it
is not clear that the distribution of buyers over submarkets is optimal.
To address this issue, let W denote the total welfare in a period for a given
information partition (; ql). The maximum social welfare of any possible as-
signment of buyers to the two submarkets dened by (; ql) is given by
W (; ql) = max
l0
n

 
1  e l ql + (1  )1  e h(;l) qh(; ql)o . (9)
Proposition 1 The decentralized search equilibrium is constrained e¢ cient.
That is, the solution to (9) is given by (8).
Proof. Substituting for h(; l) and di¤erentiating yields the rst-order con-
dition:
@W
@l
= e lql   e 
1 l
1  qh(; ql) = 0
Solving for l yields l = 1   (1   ) ln (qh(; ql)=ql), which satises l  0 as
long as qh(; ql)e
  11   ql. Otherwise, l = 0.
Proposition 1 conrms that the equilibrium search patterns of buyers max-
imize welfare within our framework. The following proposition describes how
equilibrium welfare is a¤ected by the informativenessof the partition of sellers,
and is a useful result for the comparison of reputation systems.
Proposition 2 (E¢ cient Partitioning) Equilibrium welfare increases when:
1. The number of sellers in the bad submarket with low quality products in-
creases; or
2. The number of good sellers (prior to the realization of their product quality)
in the bad submarket decreases.
Proof. Let (; ql) = (x+ y; (x + ybq) = (x+ y)) where x is the quantity of sell-
ers that have realized a low quality product and y is the number of good sellers
that have yet to realize product quality, in the bad submarket. Comparative
statics on (9) yield @W=@x > 0 and @W=@y < 0.
Proposition 2 says that the more informative the information partition, the
greater the level of equilibrium welfare. This is because greater information leads
to buyer search being directed more accurately, which reduces search frictions.
Note that the welfare level in a period in the absence of submarket creation,
given by (6), can also be written as W0 = 2W (1; eq). From proposition 2 it is
straightforward to see the following corollary.
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Corollary 1 The creation of quality-di¤erentiated submarkets always increases
equilibrium welfare. That is, W (; ql) > W (1; eq) for  < 1 and ql < eq.
This result means that if a reputation system creates quality-di¤erentiated
submarkets in one or both periods it will always increase total welfare.
3.4 Equilibrium with full information
As another benchmark, we will compare the equilibrium welfare under a reputa-
tion system to a situation of full informationin which all buyers know exactly
which sellers have high and low quality products for sale in each period. In this
case we have  = 12 +
1
2 (1  ), ql =  and qh = 1 in both periods. From (EC),
sellers with low quality products are excluded if e 
2
  . From (3), (8) and
(9), equilibrium welfare (over both periods) is given by:
WF =
8<: 2
eq   e 11  2  if e  2  


1  e  2

otherwise
. (10)
In our model, the presence of asymmetric information exacerbates the welfare
losses due to search frictions. Figure 1 compares the full information equilib-
rium welfare (given by (10)) with the equilibrium welfare when buyers have no
information about seller qualities (given by (6)) and shows the fraction of full
information equilibrium welfare that is lost due to asymmetric information.
3.5 Equilibrium with reputations for type
If the reputation system screens for type, a seller with a low quality product
for sale in the rst period gets a bad reputation in the second period. In the
rst period, advertising will not a¤ect a sellers second period payo¤s thus ad-
vertisements will have no informational content. Therefore, in the rst period
there are no submarkets created and the total value of trade between buyers
and sellers is given by W (1; eq) = 12W0.
In the second period, the number of sellers in the bad submarket is
2 = 12 +
1
2 (1  ) ,
which comprises all bad sellers plus the good sellers who had a low quality real-
ization in the rst period. The expected quality of sellers with bad reputations
is thus
q2l =
 + (1  ) bq
22
.
The total welfare of all transactions in periods 1 and 2 under this reputation
system is given by
WT = 12W0 +W (
2; q2l ). (11)
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Figure 1: Percentage welfare losses due to asymmetric information. Note the
axes have been rotated.
To quantify the e¤ects of introducing a reputation system that screens for type,
Figure 2 compares the percentage change in welfare under this system, given
by (11) with the equilibrium welfare when search is unguided, given by (6), as
well as the e¤ects on buyers and sellers. On the horizontal axes we vary the
probability that a good seller has high quality in a period () and show the
results for three di¤erent low quality levels ().
Obviously, if  = 0 then good and bad sellers are identical, and thus the
reputation system cannot create any additional welfare. The greatest possible
benet of the reputation system that screens for type occurs if  = 1, which
corresponds to the largest possible di¤erence in expected quality between good
and bad sellers. The value of the reputation system is also increasing in the
di¤erence between high and low quality levels.
From Figure 2 we can also see that for the parameter values shown all of
the gains accrue to good sellers, while buyers and bad sellers are made worse
o¤. Bad sellers are obviously worse o¤ because they are now di¤erentiated from
good sellers in the second period. Buyers are worse o¤ because although they
have some information about seller types in the second period, they end up
competing more intensely in the good submarket in the second period, which
12
Figure 2: Equilibrium welfare e¤ects of introducing a reputation system that
screens for type.
drives up the prices at these sellers.10
3.6 Equilibrium with reputations for honesty
A reputation system for honesty links a sellers advertisement in the rst period
with their reputation in the second period. Unlike the reputation system for
type, it o¤ers a mechanism by which sellers may be able to reveal meaningful in-
formation in their advertisements, and thus has the ability to create submarkets
in the rst period as well as the second period.
A seller who is honest truthfully advertises their product quality in period
1. For obvious reasons, a good seller with a high quality realization will al-
ways advertise high quality and thus is always honest and always gets a good
reputation. Therefore, we only need to solve the decision problems for the bad
type sellers and the good type sellers with a low quality realization in period 1.
These sellers must choose whether to truthfully advertise that they have a low
10 In Kennes and Schi¤ (2004) we show that an arbitrary partition of sellers into two quality-
di¤erentiated submarkets makes buyers worse o¤ relative to the equilibrium in the absence
of such a partition if (i) the partition is not su¢ ciently informative so as to allow them to
exclude sellers in the low quality submarket, or (ii) the overall ratio of buyers to sellers is
su¢ ciently high.
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quality product, or whether to untruthfully advertise high quality.
We allow for symmetric mixed strategies by sellers and use b and g to
respectively denote the probabilities that a bad seller and a good seller with a
low quality realization are honest in period 1. We assume
 (A1) If g = 0 and b = 0, then q1l = 
and
 (A2) If g = 1 and b = 1, then q2l = .
These two assumptions concern the cases where all sellers lie, or all sellers
are honest. In both cases, there exists a period with only one submarket.
The rst case leaves no sellers in the bad submarket in period 1. In this case,
A1 implies that if a seller deviated and advertised bad quality, they would be
believed to have quality level  in the rst period. The second case leaves no
sellers in the bad submarket in period 2. In this case, A2 implies that if a seller
deviated and was dishonest and obtained a bad reputation, they would also be
believed to have low quality in period 2.
Other than the cases covered by A1 and A2 the probabilities g and b give
two well-dened submarkets in each period. The probabilities g and b directly
determine the total fraction of all sellers who advertise low quality in period one.
These are the bad seller and the good sellers with low quality realizations who
have chosen to be honest. Thus,
1 = 12
 
b + (1  ) g

:
Only sellers with low quality products advertise low quality in the rst period,
so
q1l = .
All untruthful sellers with low quality products in period 1 get bad reputations
in period 2 and all truthful sellers get good reputations. Therefore, the total
fraction of all sellers with bad reputations in period 2 is given by the bad sellers
who lied in the rst period plus the good sellers with low quality realizations
who lied in the rst period:
2 = 12

(1  b) + (1  ) (1  g)

.
The expected quality of sellers with bad reputations in the second period de-
pends on the relative quantity of bad and good sellers in this submarket:
q2l =
(1  b) + (1  g) (1  ) bq
22
.
We are particularly interested in whether some sellers with low quality for
sale in the rst period will want to advertise this truthfully so as to gain a
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good reputation for the second period. For this purpose we dene the honesty
valuation, g, of a good seller with a low quality realization in the rst period
to be the di¤erence between the expected payo¤ to that seller from being honest
and lying, that is,
g =

p
 
1l
  p  1h  1; 1l   + p  2h  2; 2l   p  2l  bq. (12)
Similarly, the honesty valuation of a bad seller is
b =

p
 
1l
  p(1h(1; 1l )) + p  2h(2; 2l )  p  2l  . (13)
We now consider the equilibrium behavior of sellers under a reputation sys-
tem that screens for honesty. It is easy to establish that an equilibrium exists by
the standard Nash argument, because there is a well dened mapping of the two
mixed strategies b; g into payo¤s g; b. We can also establish the following
results about the equilibrium behavior of sellers:
Proposition 3 (Quality fosters honesty) Good sellers with low quality re-
alizations in period 1 are always at least as honest as bad sellers, that is, in
equilibrium, g  b.
Proof. From (12) and (13) we have
g   b =
 
p
 
2h
 
2; 2l
  p  2l  (bq   ) > 0
since p
 
2h
 
2; 2l

> p
 
2l

and bq >  .
Proposition 4 (Dishonesty) Some bad sellers always lie, that is, in equilib-
rium, 0  b < 1.
Proof. From proposition 3 we know that b  g. It remains to show that when
g = 1, in equilibrium we cannot have b = g. To construct a contradiction,
suppose that b = g = 1, i.e., all sellers are honest. This yields 
1 = 12 (2  ),
q1l = , q
1
h = 1, 
2 = 0, q2l =  (by A2) and q
2
h = eq. From (5) and (8) we have
1h   1l =
(
  ln  for   e  2
2
 otherwise
and
2h   2l =
(
ln eq   ln  for   eqe 1
1 otherwise
Thus,
 =
 
1h   1l
   2h   2l  =
8><>:
2
   1 for 0    e 
2

  ln    1 for e  2    eqe 1
  ln eq for eqe 1   < 1
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Case First-period behavior of sellers with low quality products g b
1 All good sellers are honest, all bad sellers lie. +  
2 All good sellers are honest, some bad sellers honest. + 0
3 Some good sellers are honest, all bad sellers lie. 0  
4 All good sellers lie and all bad sellers lie.    
Table 1: Potential equilibria under a reputation system that screens for honesty.
Note this table only shows the rst-period behavior of bad sellers and good
sellers with low quality realizations. As mentioned above, good sellers with
high quality realizations are always honest.
The rst and third cases are unambiguously positive regardless of . The second
case is positive if   e 1, which is true if   eqe 1 since eq < 1. Thus  is
always positive. Since p () is a strictly increasing function, from (13) we have
b > 0. Thus a bad seller can gain by deviating and being dishonest, so all
sellers being honest cannot be an equilibrium.
Proposition 3 arises because good sellers have a higher expected product
quality than bad sellers, which means that a good sellers gain from having
a good reputation in the second period is always greater than that of a bad
seller. Proposition 4 arises because if all sellers are honest in the rst period, the
di¤erence in expected qualities of the rst period submarkets is large, leading to
large di¤erences in rst period market tightnesses, and a high payo¤ from being
dishonest. In addition, in the second period the di¤erences in market tightnesses
are smaller, because all sellers have a good reputation and so reputations do not
serve to distinguish sellers. This makes the punishmentthat a bad seller su¤ers
in the second period from being dishonest small relative to the gains in the rst
period.
Propositions 3 and 4 give four possible equilibrium congurations, which are
characterized in Table 1. We used a numerical algorithm programmed inMatlab
to test which type(s) of equilibrium as given in Table 1 occurred for any given
set of parameter values.11 The parameters of our model are  and , which
are both numbers between zero and one, thus it is possible to check the span
of the parameter space numerically. We found that only equilibria in which all
good sellers are honest and some bad sellers are honest (case 2) exist.12 Thus
in equilibrium under the honesty system we have g = 1 and 0 < b < 1, with
b being the solution to b = 0.
The equilibrium welfare of the reputation system that screens for honesty is
11Source code for the simulation program is available from the authors on request.
12 In an earlier version of this paper we assumed that bad reputations were assigned only
with some probability to sellers who lied in period 1. If this probability is strictly less than
one, then equilibria of the other three types can also arise depending on the parameter values.
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Figure 3: Equilibrium welfare e¤ects of introducing a reputation system that
screens for honesty.
given by
WH =W
 
1; q1l

+W
 
2; q2l

(14)
where 1, q1l , 
2 and q2l are determined from the appropriate equations above.
Figure 3 shows the equilibrium e¤ects on total welfare, buyers, and sellers of
introducing a reputation system that screens for honesty relative to when buyers
have no information about sellers. As in the case of a reputation system for type,
for the parameter values shown the gains accrue to good sellers, with buyers and
bad sellers being worse o¤.
4 Comparing Reputation Systems
When does a reputation system that screens for honesty perform better than a
reputation system that screens for type? An honesty system is able to create
information in both periods, but allows bad sellers to get a good reputation
by being honest in the rst period. A type system is immune to strategic
manipulation by bad sellers, but creates information only in the second period,
and also assigns bad reputations to good sellers who happened to have low
quality for sale in the rst period. In this section we examine the welfare
implications of these tradeo¤s.
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The welfare of the reputation system for honesty is given by (14) and the
welfare of the reputation system for type is given by (11). The following propo-
sition gives a su¢ cient condition for the dominance of a reputation system that
screens for honesty.
Proposition 5 A su¢ cient condition for a reputation system that screens for
honesty to be superior to a reputation system that screens for type (WH > WT )
is if in the rst period some good sellers with low quality products are honest
and all bad sellers lie, that is, if g > 0 and b = 0 in equilibrium.
Proof. If g > 0 and b = 0 then there is some separation of sellers into
submarkets in the rst period (i.e. 1 > 0; q1l < q
1
h) under the honesty system,
but there is never rst period separation under the type system. Thus by
proposition (2) the reputation system that screens for honesty outperforms the
reputation system that screens for type in period 1.
In period 2, under the type system all sellers who sold low quality in period 1
will get a bad reputation. This will include all bad sellers and a fraction 1  of
good sellers. Under the honesty system, since g > 0 and b = 0, those with bad
reputations will include all bad sellers and a fraction
 
1  g

(1  ) of good
sellers. Therefore, proposition 2 also implies that welfare is higher in period 2
if the reputation system screens for honesty.
Stated di¤erently, a necessary condition for the superiority of a reputation
system that screens for type (WT > WH) is that some bad sellers are truthful
about having low quality. Therefore a reputation system that screens for type
is superior only if there is a problem of excessive honesty under a reputation
system that screens for honesty. As mentioned in section 3.6 above, the type
of equilibrium that arises under the honesty system has partial honesty by bad
sellers. Depending on the parameters, it is therefore possible that the type
system could be superior to the honesty system.13
Figure 4 shows which reputation system is superior for the range of possible
parameter values in our model. It can be seen that the type system can be supe-
rior to the honesty system if the probability that good sellers have high quality
products is high enough. Under such parameter values, the equilibrium honesty
level of bad sellers is so high that the honesty system performs poorly, while the
type system performs relatively well. In such cases the strategic manipulation
13 It is also straightforward to see that the two reputation systems will generate the same
amount of equilibrium welfare if the honesty system does not induce any honesty in the rst
period. This is because if all sellers lie, there are no submarkets created in the rst period
under the honesty system. In addition, all sellers who sold low quality in the rst period
were liars, so all will receive a bad reputation under an honesty system. The honesty system
therefore creates the same submarkets in the second period as the type system. In our model,
an equilibrium in which all sellers lie (case 4 in table 1) never arises, so the two systems are
never equivalent. As mentioned previously, if reputations are imperfectly assigned, then other
equilibria, including case 4, are possible.
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Figure 4: Welfare comparison of reputation systems.
of the honesty system by bad sellers causes negative e¤ects that outweigh the
value of the creation of submarkets in the rst period, rendering the type system
superior.
These results can also be related to the issue of type 1 and 2 errors in
statistics. A reputation system that screens for type reduces type 2 error it
avoids labelling someone as innocent when they are guilty while the reputation
system that screens for honesty reduces type 1 error  it can avoid labelling
someone as guilty when they are innocent.
As a nal comparison, gure 5 shows the fraction of the full information wel-
fare level (given by (10)) that is achieved in equilibrium under both reputation
systems.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we developed a simple model of reputation systems in markets
with search frictions and asymmetric information between buyers and sellers.
In equilibrium, there exists a trade-o¤ between the two simple reputation sys-
tems that we considered. Therefore, this model can explain some observed
di¤erences about these institutions. For example, the model can explain why
a professional association cares most about the conduct of its members, thus
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Figure 5: Percentage of full information welfare achieved by the reputation
systems.
always rewarding honesty, while a restaurant guidebook will often ignore what
is said in the advertisements of sellers. Our model also gives some criteria by
which to judge the performance of a reputation system. We found that the
potential downside of a reputation system that screens for honesty is that bad
sellers might overinvest in honesty to gain a good reputation.
We caution that our model abstracts from two problems that are also perti-
nent to the performance of a reputation system in practice. The rst abstraction
is that we do not allow the possibility of cheap pseudonyms where sellers can
exit in one period and reappear in the next with an untarnished reputation (see,
for example, Friedman and Resnick, 2001). In the context of our model, we can
rule out this opportunistic behavior simply by assuming that the reputation
system awards the cheap pseudonym strategy a bad reputation in the second
period. The excessive honesty problem in our model is exactly opposite to the
problem of cheap pseudonyms. Therefore, the solution to the cheap pseudonym
problem choosing a su¢ ciently low reputation starting point has no bearing
on the choice between the two simple reputation systems, because the problem
of excessive honesty works in the opposite direction.
The second abstraction is that we do not allow sellers a choice over the set of
products for sale. Therefore, there is no possibility that a seller might choose to
honestly sell one set of products in period one in order to get a good reputation
and then choose to sell another set of products in the second period to exploit
this reputation.14 If we did allow both types of sellers to pursue this strategy
we could expect to see reputation ination, but it is unclear how these choices
a¤ect the relative performance of the two reputation systems. In either case,
our model makes clear that it is a problem of excessive honesty, not excessive
product choice, which is central to the trade-o¤ between reputation systems.
There are a number of potential directions for further research. It might be
14This is known as reputation milkingand McAfee (2004) discusses this problem in con-
nection to the reputation system of eBay.
20
interesting to extend our two period model to one with a longer planning horizon.
For example, a multi-period model could illustrate factors that determine when
a bad seller chooses to cash in his/her reputation. Another possibility is to
consider the sale of third party information services. One method to sell third
party information is an accreditation service that sells reputation services to its
members (i.e. the sellers in our model). An alternative method of selling third
party information is a guidebook that sells information about sellers directly to
buyers. It would be of interest to discover whether there is a connection between
the type of reputation system used and the method by which a third party sells
its information.
Finally, there are several reasons why our model may nd some use in ex-
perimental economics. One reason is that the assumptions of our model are
somewhat more realistic than the assumptions of alternative models. Realism
in our model is supported by our assumption of endogenous matching buy-
ers choose which sellers to search over and by our assumption of endogenous
price formation buyers bid subject to the presence or absence of local market
competitors. A second reason is that our model has a nite horizon and so it
can be implemented in a lab where playing time is obviously a constraint. The
nal reason for using our model in experiments is its simple trading structure,
which could be easily communicated to participants in a laboratory setting.
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